A Guide for a Just Society

and a

Just World Order

of relevance to

Governments
(including International Institutions),
Politicians, Business Leaders
and
the General Public

by

Dermot Layden

A Guide for a Just Society and a Just World Order.
ISBN 978-1-910097-25-0
Copyright © 2014 Dermot Layden

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Published and printed in Ireland by Lettertec Ireland Ltd.

No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any device,
without the prior written permission of the copyright holder.

This book may not be circulated without a cover
or in any cover other than the existing cover.

Dedication

This publication is dedicated
to all institutions and peoples who at this time promote
the wellbeing and dignity of the human person,
or would want to do so in the future.

1.

Introduction

At the outset I wish to state that the contents of this short book are in no way the result of my limited competence in the topics under discussion. Rather the contents derive essentially from existing and very expert religious publications together with input of a number of people as detailed in the Acknowledgements. I regard myself merely as the scribe who brought the material together and hopefully presented it in an intelligible and coherent manner from the point of view of you the reader.

The principal material forming the basis of this book is the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and more specifically the chapter there of entitled “The Human Community” which deals with society, the human person and related matters. In my view, the material in this chapter ought to be of vital interest to all peoples, irrespective of their religious beliefs. This chapter of the Catechism so eloquently and succinctly deals with topics concerning society, the human person, and how we should be governed that I regard it, not merely as doctrinal guidance, but as a blueprint for humanity everywhere. I should point out that in my autumn years I have the great privilege of participating in a wonderful course on the Catechism in St. Mary’s Presbytery, Sligo which is proving to be a most exciting and fulfilling experience. When studying the chapter on The Human Community, I was intrigued to discover that the concept of subsidiarity was dealt with, as I assumed this was a fairly recent concept developed by the European Union. In fact the concept was expressed by Pope Pius XI in 1931 but anticipated by Pope Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum in 1891. Perhaps this is just a small example of how relevant the contents of the Catechism are in general to us human beings trying to make a meaningful life for ourselves on this planet. I am constantly amazed by how comprehensively and ably the Catechism deals with what life is all about, who we human beings are, and what is our destiny. My regret is that I did not study the Catechism and related material many years ago.

On the Catechism course, I and my colleagues are particularly fortunate to have available to us a most excellent set of Notes elucidating and elaborating the Catechism contents, which were prepared by the Maryvale Institute in the UK.¹ The Maryvale Notes supporting “The Human Community” chapter of the Catechism are so illuminating and fulsome, that I found myself transcribing them almost in full in this book. I am truly grateful to Maryvale for their permission to use their Notes so liberally. I hope that you, the reader, will find them as useful as I do.

I have also been inspired by Vatican documents, in particular those of Pope Francis, most notably his 2014 Lenten Message and the Evangelii Gaudium [The Joy of the Gospel]. As is well known, Pope Francis’s pontificate is one that embraces the poor, the downtrodden and the marginalised, and his general concern for social justice in the world. Both of the documents above make extensive reference to these issues. Specifically your attention is drawn to the chapter entitled “The Social Dimension of Evangelization” in Evangelii Gaudium. The Pope’s opening paragraph notes that:

To evangelize is to make the kingdom of God present in our world … I would now like to share my concerns about the social dimension of evangelization, precisely because if this dimension is not properly brought out, there is a constant risk of distorting the authentic and integral meaning of the mission of evangelization.

(Chapter 4, page 139)

The risk of distortion that the Pope refers to is the risk that evangelization might be regarded as the saving of the individual soul rather than the recuperation of society as a whole. He notes that “[t]o believe that the Holy Spirit is at work in everyone means realizing that he seeks to penetrate every human situation and all social bonds” (page 140) and goes on to deal with several of the issues covered in this book.

The contents of the Catechism on society, as covered here in this book, are, as already suggested, of serious interest to people of all faiths, and indeed to those of none. And furthermore, I believe the contents herein have a very special relevance to leaders and governments everywhere (including of course politicians and international organisations, such as the European Union, United Nations, and so on). The combined Catechism and Maryvale material on society and related matters is (in my view) of such a high quality and calibre and is so pertinent to all of us, including governments, I felt obliged to share it with others, via this book. Of course, I take full responsibility for any shortcomings that exist therein.

I might add that the purpose of publishing this book is certainly not financial gain (in fact the book will be distributed fairly widely free of charge, at least initially). Rather the purpose is to encourage our governments and leaders always to act in the best interests of humanity, who were created by God in his own image, and as the Bible says:

You have made us little less than gods;
and crowned us with glory and honour,
gave us power over the works of your hand,
put all things under our feet.

(Psalm 8)

God who could have lorded over us, choose not to do so; surely those of us who are privileged to lead should show similar humanity and compassion.But sadly too often governments and leaders do not afford people the honour, respect and freedom due to them, and not least the freedom pertaining to the exercise of conscience, the practice of religion and many others. How often are these freedoms which are given to us by our Creator, trampled upon by regimes whose basic rightful authority also originates with that same Creator? These freedoms and several other relevant issues will be touched upon in this book, including of course the issue of the under-privileged and starving peoples of the world. Can we really, on a personal level, enjoy our relatively affluent conditions when so many people live in abject poverty, and/or are pushed out of their homes into refugee camps, or worse, by uncaring or corrupt administrations? Are we, that is, me, you, national governments, and the international community fulfilling our obligations in these matters?

_____________________

¹ These Notes are also available to the public – Maryvale’s website is given in the Acknowledgements section.

2.

Acknowledgements

The Bibliography lists the sources of material used in compiling this book, which principally were the chapter on “The Human Community” from the Catechism of the Catholic Church, (hereafter referred to as the Catechism) together with elaborating notes thereon produced by the Maryvale Institute. For readers who are interested in exploring these topics further, the list of Suggested Further Reading includes works by Padraig Corkery and John Murray as well as the full list of other documents referred within the extracts from the Catechism and the Maryvale notes.

However, as mentioned, the principal material used in compiling this book is (1) the Catechism and (2) Notes from the Maryvale Institute, specifically the Maryvale Institute Notes are those forming part of Unit 4 of their Certificate in Studies of the Catechism programme. Maryvale Institute has its headquarters in Birmingham (UK) and is a registered Charitable Trust. It administers a range of courses and programmes, details of which can be found on their website www.maryvale.ac.uk. The Maryvale Institute has a long history. Blessed John Henry Newman and his followers had an association with it, and in fact it was Blessed Newman who named it “Maryvale”. As already indicated, Maryvale’s Notes on the Catechism deserve the very highest of praise and I am extremely grateful to be allowed to use them liberally and freely in this book. And of course I am equally grateful to be allowed to quote freely from the Catechism of the Catholic Church, courtesy of the publishers Veritas. The Catechism of course comprises the bedrock material on which this book is based, and specifically that material which is contained in chapter two “The Human Community” in part three of the Catechism. But understandably, various issues and doctrines covered in other parts of the Catechism, as they impact on social issues/ human community, will have been taken into account in the chapter on The Human Community. One example of this is the concept of the natural law.² Furthermore, other sections of the Catechism do make references to various social issues, such as the section dealing with the Ten Commandments, and more specifically commandments 5, 7 and 8.

Most grateful thanks are also extended to the publishers (Catholic Truth Society/ Ignatius Press) of the youth version of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, known as YOUCAT, for permission to insert as an Appendix to this book actual reproductions of the relevant paragraphs of YOUCAT dealing with Society (i.e. Human Community). These actual reproductions will give you the opportunity to appreciate the imaginative and colourful manner in which this youth version of the Catechism is presented, principally through using a question and answer approach, and also providing helpful explanatory notes and references in the margins. YOUCAT can be highly recommended not just to the youth but to people of all age groups, and not just to Catholics but those of all religions and of none. Yes YOUCAT is a friendly read and should be, I suggest, on every reader’s list. Pope Benedict XVI was very optimistic about the prospects of YOUCAT in his Foreword to the book, which was published in thirteen different languages in 2011 to coincide with World Youth Day and has since been translated into many more languages [Incidentally, the attached pages in the Appendix are in ‘black and white’, but the YOUCAT book does in fact incorporate colour.]

I am particularly fortunate and most grateful that Dr. John Murray, Lecturer in Moral Theology at the Mater Dei Institute of Education, Dublin, took upon himself the responsibility of reviewing the contents of this book. I am most grateful for the benefit of his expert knowledge in this whole area of doctrine.

On a personal level I am most grateful to my colleagues participating with me on our Catechism course for their help and inspiration in this project, and more generally for their positive inputs into the course programme by way of reflections and testimonies, and also for the wonderful comradeship that has developed among us. And in all of this I certainly include our wonderful course facilitator and our spiritual director.

And I thank Lettertec Publishing, Cork, for their usual competent work in producing this book, and also helping with its distribution. By no means least, I thank my own family for their help and encouragement in this project.

_____________________

² The Catechism states that the natural law “provides the indispensable moral foundation for building the human community” (para. 1959). In explaining the natural law, the Catechism states that the “natural law expresses the original moral sense which enables man to discern by reason the good and the evil, the truth and the lie…” (1954). It goes on to note its universality as follows: “The natural law, present in the heart of each man and established by reason, is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all men…” (1956).

3.

Book: An Overview

This is a very welcome book and a very timely one at that, and everyone associated with its production deserve our highest compliments and congratulations.
The book deals with the very essence of peoples’ lives as they function, or should function, in society, and it covers in a very competent manner an extensive range of topics in regard to such functioning.
The book surely provides a blueprint for how individual societies and the global world should operate, so that the God given capacities, talents, freedoms and the inalienable rights of individuals, and indeed of nations, are fully respected and thus enable, among other things, the common good always to be sought after.
Social justice, both at home and abroad, including the provision of the basic necessities of life (food, clothing, etc.), gets appropriate coverage in the book. And so does the Holy Father, Pope Francis, get appropriate mentioning for his concern for the poor, and in this regard there is a particular reference to his very relevant Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii Gaudium.

The book, as indicated, covers an extensive range of topics (please see Contents page) which are all very relevant to us as responsible, active and fully fledged citizens of our individual nations, and also of our role on the international stage. Sadly, too often we are inclined to isolate ourselves from our communities and leave the ‘running’ to others to attend to, and often in the process just ‘blame our politicians’!
The book is beautifully produced and is very accessible and readable, and is surely thought provoking for all of us. So whether you are an ordinary member of the public, or a politician at local, national or transnational level, and maybe also a member of a national government or a transnational governing body, or whatever your station is in life, you should find this book of considerable interest and relevance to you and also fulfilling. Hopefully it will be widely read.
A senior Church person who had a preview of this book said he would be sending a copy of the book to Pope Francis – this being the measure of the importance he attaches to this book. Do Enjoy!

4.

The Human Community: Person and Society

4 (a) The Community Dimension of our Vocation

The following are the relevant paragraphs from the Catechism of the Catholic Church (hereafter referred to as the Catechism) relevant to this sub-section:

1877 “The vocation of humanity is to show forth the image of God and to be transferred into the image of the Father’s only Son. This vocation takes a personal form since each of us is called to enter into divine beatitude; it also concerns the human community as a whole.”

1878 “All men are called to the same end: God himself. There is a certain resemblance between the union of the divine persons and the fraternity that men are to establish among themselves in truth and love (ref. Gaudium et Spes [GS] para. 3)³. Love of neighbour is inseparable from love for God.”

1879 “The human person needs to live in society. Society is not for him an extraneous [irrelevant] addition but a requirement of his nature. Through the exchange with others, mutual service and dialogue with his brethren, man develops his potential; he thus responds to his vocation (ref. GS para. 1).”

1880 “A society is a group of persons bound together organically by a principle of unity that goes beyond each one of them. As an assembly that is at once visible and spiritual, a society endures through time: it gathers up the past and prepares for the future. By means of society, each man is established as an ‘heir’ and receives certain ‘talents’ that enrich his identity and whose fruits he must develop (ref. Luke 19:13, 15). He rightly owes loyalty to the communities of which he is part, and respect to those in authority who have charge of the common good.”

Maryvale, at the outset of “The Community Dimension of our Vocation”, notes that the “Catechism is a synthesis of Catholic doctrine in the light of the Second Vatican Council [Vatican II], requested by the extraordinary Synod of Bishops of 1985.”
Reflecting on one of the Vatican II documents, Gaudium et Spes (and as alluded to in paragraph 1877 of the Catechism), Maryvale reminds us that “our vocation to reflect and build up the image of God touches us as persons and as community,” noting that “we have a common vocation as human beings (paragraph 1878).” It then goes on to state three aspects of our communal vocation:

* We all have the same end. Christians do not have a different end from other people. God created us all and calls us all to share communion with Him; He is our end.

* We are called to live together as brothers and sisters to reflect in some way the unity of the Divine Persons Our love of God is inseparable from the love of in the Trinity.

* Our love of God is inseparable from the love of neighbour or it is not true love of God; moreover our neighbour is all people. To love our neighbour as we should, our intentions need to be pure and our behaviour less ambiguous;
in short, it needs to be rooted in the love of God.

Maryvale continues: “A common vocation of all people, not just of believers, stems from our common end and from the will of Christ to save all.” Under the heading “Society and Vocation”, Maryvale comments as follows:

A complementary approach to this communal vocation results from a reflection upon our need as persons for society. Now, this can be contentious, as people react to various forms of intrusion into their lives. It is also true that society cannot be properly seen as separate from persons. We are not here trying to justify any particular form of society. The Catechism seeks only to stress the need for some society.
The conviction that we all need to live in society [no man is an island] can be grounded in our experience, which shows that people who have lived in isolation for a long time have invariably been impaired in their development as persons. Taking up GS [Gaudium et Spes] 25, the Catechism asserts forcefully that, far from being an extraneous [irrelevant] addition, society is “a requirement of his nature” (1879). Highlighting exchange, service and dialogue, it pinpoints ways in which our human potential depends for its growth on having dealings with other people […] sharing our gifts with others, all seem to be necessary to enable ourselves and others, to flourish. Living in society is necessary to fulfil our vocation seen in the threefold form just discussed.

Maryvale goes on to deal, at some length, with “Society, Authority and Human History”, as follows:

Whatever society is, it seems to be “a group of persons bound together by a principle of unity that goes beyond each one of them” (1880).This definition could apply to the family, a trade union, the U.N., a senior citizens’ group, to any society, formal or informal. It could apply to the Church. Two points of special significance [Maryvale states] need to be underlined:
1. The Catechism notes that we owe loyalty to the societies to which we belong and respect to those in authority in charge of the common good. Clearly, societies need some organisation, limited and highly informal or widespread and very technical, depending on how complex the society is. Proper loyalty to those responsible for running them is normally rightly expected and legitimate. We should add that this loyalty is not automatic. If the society does not have a morally good purpose, we ought not to belong to it, and, if we do, our duty is not to sustain those in charge …
2. The Catechism [also] notes that a society endures through time. This is especially true of broader societies such as peoples, political entities, and so on. This is an important reflection of the historical nature of the human person … people develop as time goes by … Any society is a product of the past and, as long as it continues, hand things on to the future. In this sense, it is the bearer of traditions.
Thus by means of society, each man is an “heir”, receiving “talents” from the past whose fruits he must develop (1880). This truth means that we all depend on others, on countless persons of the past, from whose inventions, work and ideas they benefit … John Paul II wrote [Laborem Exercens [LE] 9] in an encyclical on human work that all of us receive by this means a donation or gift from nature and, ultimately from the Creator, upon which we may work and from which we may benefit. It would also be true to say that all of us receive such gifts from other persons in the past …

Considering the community dimension as described above reminds me in my autumn years that society is a gift from God and from those who went before us, but also that it is an active and living thing which requires our loyalty and commitment to preserve and/or change it in order that we may responsibly pass on this rich heritage to those who come after us.

4 (b) The Human Person and Participation in Society

Here are the relevant Catechism paragraphs:

1881 “Each community is defined by its purpose and consequently obeys specific rules; but ‘the human person … is and ought to be the principle, the subject and the end of every social organization’ (Gaudium et Spes [GS] 25 para.1)”.

1882 “Certain societies, such as the family and the state, correspond more directly to the nature of man; they are necessary to him. To promote the participation of the greatest number in the life of a society, the creation of voluntary associations and institutions must be encouraged ‘on both national and international levels, which relate to economic and social goals, to cultural and recreational activities, to sport, to various professions, and to political affairs’ [John XXIII, Mater et Magistra 60]. This ‘socialization’ also expresses the natural tendency for human beings to associate with one another for the sake of attaining objectives that exceed individual capacities. It develops the qualities of the person, especially the sense of initiative and responsibility, and helps guarantees his rights (ref. Gaudium et Spes 25 para. 2; John Paul II, Centesimus Annus 12).”

Maryvale Notes:

Of course, society has many different types of participation which have varied goals and offer different possibilities for development. Maryvale observes that the “rules of a chess club will be less onerous than those of a modern state; the possibilities for development (and also for damage) will be far more limited in the former than in the latter.”

And under the heading “The Person at the Heart of Society”, Maryvale observes as follows:

The way in which persons should be related to societies and in particular to the society of a state has been a matter of considerable dispute over the centuries. It has also been the object of enormous development. Mutual responsibilities of government and citizen in terms of defence, obedience and taxation would be a common feature. In some views citizens should be left alone as much as possible (laissez-faire: let things be), while for others the state should organise as much as possible of people’s lives to ensure proper direction and cohesion (totalitarianism: state control in principle of all areas of life). The twentieth century has seen extreme versions of totalitarianism in Fascist and Nazi rule on the one hand and Communist rule on the other, while it has also seen the dangers of people being left too much to their own fate as in the ravages of the Depression.

Maryvale suggests that the “Catechism is not trying to engage in political debates or to restrict legitimate political and social differences and preferences”, observing that followers of Jesus do not necessarily share the same views or opinions. The “concern here is rather to point out some basic moral principleswhich ought to govern all societies, small or complex.” Some consequences of ignoring these basic principles are “the exploitation of workers in unbridled capitalist societies, [...] the interference with people’s right to think, to worship, or to organise even local culture groups or social clubs except under state control.”

These basic principles are founded, as Maryvale notes, on the human being as the pinnacle of God’s achievement and on all human beings as being equally entitled to dignity and respect.

Stemming from the conviction of faith that “the human person is the only creature on earth that God has wanted for its own sake” (GS 24), an expression of the truth that man was at the summit of God’s creative activity (Genesis 1:26-27), the Second Vatican Council enunciated a key principle, repeated in para.1881 of the Catechism. In acknowledging fully man’s need of society (based on his very nature), the Council said, the human person “is and ought to be the beginning, the subject and the object of every social organisation” (GS 25). This would exclude treating the human person as little more than a cog in a wheel … in different ways [sadly], the human person is treated as dispensable. The Catechism’s reiteration of the principle that the person ought to be the beginning, subject and object of all social bodies reaffirms the dignity of every human person, never to be treated manipulatively, never to be used, but always to be respected as a subject. So, all societies should serve the person’s true needs; in this sense he or she is their “object” as well as subject.

Maryvale goes on, under the heading “Participation and Responsibility” to consider that the individual’s participation should ideally go beyond that of family and state:

Based on the twin truths that the human person is a social being by nature, needing and belonging to society, and that he is its centre and subject, the Catechism speaks of how he should relate to society, to all societies (para.1882). Societies necessary to the human person are seen as the family and the state … Voluntary social organisations, groups for sports, leisure, the workplace, the locality, the environment, politics, etc., at local level and also nationally and internationally are important in helping people to collaborate for common goals. John XXIII saw the need for such groups in all areas of life; groups not limited to family and state (Mater et Magistra [MM] 60).
All social organisations have the role not just of helping people to attain external aims, but of helping them to develop as persons. It is precisely in learning to co-operate with others, to listen and learn, to compromise where appropriate, to respect legitimate differences, etc., that the capacities of each one are fostered and put at the service of the community. This is “socialisation” in the right sense, a process of enabling persons to contribute to the well-being of others through cooperation.

We have said that all of us are social by nature. Thomas Aquinas saw our tendency to associate with others as one of the basic natural inclinations which make up our being (Summa Theologiae 1-11, q. 94, a.2). There is a need for the state to serve people’s needs, but voluntary social organisations have a role in-between the role of the family and that of the state … The chance for all of us to play an ‘active role’ (John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, 26) helps develop our qualities as persons and to develop our initiative and responsibility (para.1882). The Catechism is right to say that this is also a protection of our human rights in that it stops other organisations or the state itself taking over too much and thereby denying us the opportunity to be responsible and to participate in the construction of a more just society. In a world of vast economic and social movements, participating through these intermediate bodies in social life also helps to personalise society(John Paul II, Centesimus Annus [CA] 49).

We can see, then, how the Catechism has crystallised some basic concerns of the Church’s social teaching in this century in these important principles that the person is the subject and object of all organisations and ought to participate actively in their life; this not to promote any selfishness or individualism, but to foster the authentic progress of all human persons.

The foregoing highlights the importance of society to us all and underlines our need, as part of our development, to participate in it. It is a due reminder to governments everywhere, that we citizens should always be the “beginning, subject and object of every social organisation” yet it is also a reminder to us individuals that participation in society is not for our own ends but for the needs of all humanity.

4 (c) The Principle of Subsidiarity

Here are the relevant Catechism paragraphs:

1883 “Socialization also presents dangers. Excessive intervention by the state can threaten personal freedom and initiative. The teaching of the Church has elaborated the principle of subsidiarity, according to which ‘a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good’ (Centesimus Annus [CA] 48 para. 4; ref. Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno [QA], 184-186).”

1884 “God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of power. He entrusts to every creature the functions it is capable of performing, according to the capacities of its own nature. This mode of governance ought to be followed in social life. The way God acts in governing the world, which bears witness to such great regard for human freedom, should inspire the wisdom of those who govern human communities. They should behave as ministers of divine providence.”

1885 “The principle of subsidiarity is opposed to all forms of collectivism. It sets limits for state intervention. It aims at harmonizing the relationships between individuals and societies. It tends toward the establishment of true international order.”

Maryvale commences its commentary by stating that the principle of subsidiarity “is now discussed in the European Community in respect of the rights of member states vis-à-vis the Community, but it is in fact a long-standing principle of Catholic social teaching, clear in Pius XI’s momentous encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno [QA]).” In organisational terms, the principle of subsidiarity aims to have authority situated at the lowest level possible, in order to give the maximum level of autonomy to the community. While this may seem to be a principle of interest primarily for political unions and federal governments, Maryvale’s historical context demonstrates otherwise:

The principle of subsidiarity was expressed by Pius XI in 1931 to state that a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions (QA 79-80).

What it proclaims was anticipated by Leo XIII (Rerum Novarum, 37-38) in 1891 … There is no doubt that, in our complex, contemporary world, social organisation needs to be more elaborate than in centuries when people lived in small village communities. In all areas of life, from the economy to politics, to international peace, it would be impossible for things to be otherwise.

Maryvale further explains how this principle applies to today’s society:

Some degree of efficiency is needed to ensure people have access to adequate food supplies, for questions of safety in the work-place or in the home, in the city or between nations to be properly addressed. Nor is it hard to see the need to arrange systematic education to transmit to successive generations the insights of past and present. The problem is that ‘socialisation’ carries dangers, precisely for the personal freedom and initiative which … are basic qualities of a person which ought to be developed by active participation in society.

Thus, the principle of subsidiarity can be seen as a protection against any interference, whether by the state or by other bodies such as employers’ associations or trade unions, with the freedom and responsibility which we all need to foster to develop ourselves and to serve others in society (para. 1883). It could be said that this principle is the negative protection necessary for the principle of participation to be implemented.

Under the heading “Government and Freedom”, Maryvale explains that the principle of subsidiarity is of vital importance in the relationship between government and the people:

The Catechism reminds us in effect that government is not an end in itself; it operates under God (para. 1884). It can be said that God wills that we be governed. “Render unto Caesar …” (Matthew 22:21) implies that there is a legitimate place for government, to order affairs, protect against crime and promote good citizenship (1 Peter 2: 13-17).

However, this paragraph (1884) makes a very interesting point about how we are governed, one which applies to all levels of society. God is the Lord of all, but he entrusts power to our freedom and responsibility. We should imitate this by entrusting to everyone the responsibility for doing what he is capable of doing. This is another way of approaching subsidiarity. God’s action here shows “such great regard for human freedom” that we should treat one another similarly. Those who govern human communities are ministers of divine providence. This means they are not masters of other human beings in any absolute sense. The first Letter of Peter reminds us, when urging us to accept political authority, that “You are slaves of no-one except God” (1Peter 2: 16). Government is a service of other human persons and communities, for which those with that task are responsible to God.

However, subsidiarity does not reject regulation; as Maryvale observes, it tempers it.

There are many ways in which Governments appearto infringe our freedom. It is important to remember that freedom does not mean licence to do as we please. Not everyone likes paying taxes … etc. It would be a mistake to think the Catechism is warning us against such regulations, since they are part of the proper function of government to promote not the self-centred good of a few, but the common good of all. Subsidiarity does not mean a rejection of any regulation; it involves the proper limitation of that role. More broadly, the principle applies to non-government groups and also to the relations between states.

The Maryvale notes go on to set the principle of subsidiarity in context, both in the development of political theory and in international politics. Under the heading “Broader Scope of the principle of Subsidiarity” Maryvale observes that:

The principle of subsidiarity arose in the context of early Marxist claims to organise the whole of society through a meticulously planned economy. It also arose in the context of the serious neglect of people’s basic rights because individualism and capitalism did not protect workers adequately; profit came before labour … The principle of subsidiarity was and remains a reaction to excessive individualism on the one hand and excessive collectivism on the other. It opposes all forms of collectivism as an ideology or practice, but that does not mean it is opposed to state intervention; it does not oppose it as such, but it limits such intervention (para. 1885). In other words, the principle both justifies and limits such intervention.

The principle concerns any social organisation in respect of its members, local bodies in regard to wider ones. It is also applicable on an international scale (and so would be relevant to individual states and the European Community). The Catechism says it tends to the establishment of an international order (para. 1885). We may be able to see the principle in its double dimension in John Paul II’s Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 32-33. Stating that “the development of the whole person and of every person is a duty of all towards all”, to be shared by all parts of the world, the Pope adds that people’s need for development should not be used as an excuse for imposing a different culture on them; neither solidarity or freedom should be sacrificed in this process.

So this important concept of subsidiarity is not a recent invention of the European Community; rather it is a well established principle of social organisation which was promoted by the Church for the purpose of ensuring the proper exercise of democracy and freedom of the people at the heart of society.

4 (d) Person, Society and the Hierarchy of Values

Here are the relevant Catechism paragraphs relating to this topic:

1886 “Society is essential to the fulfilment of the human vocation. To attain this aim, respect must be accorded to the just hierarchy of values, which ‘subordinates physical and instinctual dimensions to interior and spiritual ones’ (Centesimus Annus 36, para. 2):

Human society must primarily be considered something pertaining to the spiritual. Through it, in the bright light of truth, men should share their knowledge, be able to exercise their rights and fulfil their obligations, be inspired to seek spiritual values; mutually derive genuine pleasure from the beautiful, of whatever order it be; always be readily disposed to pass on to others the best of their own cultural heritage; and eagerly strive to make their own the spiritual achievements of others. These benefits not only influence, but at the same time give aim and scope to all that has bearing on cultural expressions, economic and social institutions, political movements and forms, laws, and all other structures by which society is outwardly established and constantly developed (ref. John XXIII, Pacem in Terris [PT] 36).”

1887 “The inversion of means and ends, (ref. Centesimus Annus 41) which results in giving the value of ultimate end to what is only a means for attaining it, or in viewing persons as mere ends to that end, engenders unjust structures which ‘make Christian conduct in keeping with the commandments of the divine Law-giver difficult and almost impossible’ (Pius XII, Address at Pentecost, 1 June 1941).”

Maryvale comments that so far “we have seen how the human person is at the heart of society and how social groups or organisations ought to serve the true interests of human persons” as well as considering the “the principles of participation and solidarity⁴ (see also paras.1939-1942) and the principle of subsidiarity.” It is time to move on to “another key principle of the Church’s social teaching namely, the principle of the hierarchy of values.” Maryvale explores this under the heading “The Hierarchy of Values: Spiritual over Instinctual” [the latter term emanating from the word ‘instinct’].

The Catechism refers us (para.1886) to John Paul II’s … social encyclical, Centesimus Annus [CA], 36,which says that the right order of values: “subordinates physical and instinctual dimensions to interior and spiritual ones”. It cites John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris [PT]which points out that culture, knowledge, truth, beauty, etc., affect and should affect economics, politics, laws and society (PT 36). They are the higher values which ought to inspire and animate our everyday life in its different spheres of activity.

We can perhaps go a little further and say that certain versions of culture and truth, etc., do affect our lives in many ways. We are all much more aware nowadays of the impact of the media. We know that many young people grow up taking their values from what they see done and applauded or done and effectively unchallenged in television programmes, in newspapers and magazines, via computer networks. Culture in the form of peer group activity and pressure has its impact too. Where people, not only the young, see the success of consumerism, the glorification of possessions, indulgence of sexual urges with little other than mutual consent operating as a norm, it can have a serious effect upon the system of values. This is the sort of issue to which John XXIII adverted and to which John Paul II, with the experience of over thirty years of such experiences in Western societies, now recalls our attention. Such a system of values expresses what is the case to a greater or lesser extent; of itself it does not indicate what ought to be the case.

Continuing with the “Hierarchy of Values”, Maryvale then deals with another aspect of it, that is “Being over Having”. “Another aspect to the question of the hierarchy of values arises when we read Vatican II on how we ought to behave with reference to the resources of the earth, the technological developments of our age, and so on.” Maryvale then quotes from Gaudium et Spes:

Human activity proceeds from man; it is also ordered to him. When he works, not only does he transform matter and society, but he fulfils himself … Rightly understood, this kind of growth is more precious than any wealth that can be amassed. It is what a man is rather than what he has, that counts … Technical progress is necessary for human progress, but is powerless to bring it about (GS 35).

The insight offered by this Vatican II document was then developed further, taken up by – as Maryvale notes – “Paul VI (Populorum Progressio, 19; Octogesima Adveniens, 24) and John Paul II (SRS, 28)”. Maryvale summarises the Church’s current thinking and highlights the importance of how we use our technical progress.

This key principle underlines the fact that, true or authentic development is not to be had in merely gathering more possessions. What matters even more is the sort of people we become. This is in no way intended to disparage genuine scientific and technological achievements, but is to put them into perspective. They are needed to help those especially in need, but whether or not they contribute to authentic development depends upon the use to which they are put. If they [i.e. achievements] are largely kept by those who have them or used for their self-indulgence, they will not achieve much.

Maryvale explains that development should benefit all people:

The central truth emphasised by John Paul II is that development is not just about having more goods and it is not just economic; it involves enabling all peoples to have access to culture, to participate in the construction of their societies, to be able to pursue their vocation also in respect of God in a life of faith. Development, he says, is a moral issue (SRS 28-31).

And Maryvale finishes this section by considering the “Ends and Means” aspect of the Hierarchy of Values:

The Catechism rightly moves on to look at the way values are lived very often in our world. It identifies the problem as a basic one: that is, inverting moral values so that what should be an end is treated as merely a means (para. 1887). This happens when persons are treated as means rather than ends. The unjust social structures which result are seen when workers’ rights are not respected or the unemployed are not cared for (CA 15) or when people are manipulated as tools in a class conflict of an ideological nature (CA 14); the person’s dignity and responsibility are ignored and treated with contempt. The right hierarchy of values is inverted when a totalitarian system or a dictatorship does not accept criteria of objective right and wrong; whatever agrees with the party is right, whatever challenges it is wrong (CA 45). This can happen too when the mass media, public opinion, political interests in more democratic countries cease to respect such objective standards of morality and a moral relativism then weakens the proper basis on which the fundamental rights of all citizens and others rest. Discrimination against the unborn, the aged, the incurably sick readily result (Evangelium Vitae 58-59, 65).

In this so-called age of materialism and consumerism, it is wholesome to be reminded of the importance of the higher values in living fulfilled lives. It is surely these higher values that endure the test of time, and will be remembered by future generations. As Pope John XXIII said: “Do not walk through time without leaving worthy evidence of your passage.”

4 (e) Conversion, Grace and Social Progress

Here are the relevant paragraphs of the Catechism:

1888 “It is necessary, then, to appeal to the spiritual and moral capacities of the human person and to the permanent need for his inner conversion, so as to obtain social changes that will really serve him. The acknowledged priority of the conversion of heart in no way eliminates but on the contrary imposes the obligation of bringing the appropriate remedies to institutions and living conditions when they are an inducement to sin, so that they conform to the norms of justice and advance the good rather than hinder it (ref. Lumen Gentium 36)”

1889 “Without the help of grace, men would not know how ‘to discern the often narrow path between the cowardice which gives into evil, and the violence which under the illusion of fighting evil only makes it worse’ (Centesimus Annus 25).This is the path of charity, that is, of the love of God and of neighbour. Charity is the greatest social commandment. It respects others and their rights. It requires the practice of justice, and it alone makes us capable of it. Charity inspires a life of self-giving: ‘Whoever seeks to gain his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life will preserve it’ (Luke 17: 33).”

Maryvale’s opening commentary in this section is: “The hierarchy of values and the question of authentic progress have been seen to be essentially moral matters … This immediately brings up the issue of conversion, not an easy topic at the best of times, and more problematic in the context of social justice.”

Then Maryvale proceeds under the heading “Inner Moral Conversion” to comment:

The Catechism unambiguously makes it clear that the social changes needed can only come about from the spiritual and moral capacities of the human being and from inner conversion (para. 1888). The need for this conversion is a permanent one in all of us. This should be seen in the light of the hierarchy of spiritual and moral values over economic and political ones. Nevertheless, the Catechism says this ‘in no way eliminates, but … imposes the obligation of seeking appropriate remedies’. This point is similar to what we have seen about our social responsibilities in general. Progress on earth is not identical with the growth of the kingdom of God, but is intimately bound up with it (GS 39).

The seriousness of the situation can be seen from the fact that the Catechism speaks of these unjust social structures as inducements to sin. The changes introduced on the grounds of this inner moral conversion should be based on justice and doing what is morally good. Such an inner conversion would demand care so as to discern the true needs of justice, to avoid prejudice and fear, etc. However, one of the main problems would be persuading other people that there was a need for change and that the changes proposed were appropriate and necessary. This too would be part of conversion. Making the social structures conform to the norms of justice and making them help to advance moral good is likewise a life-long process.

Maryvale continues under the heading of “Grace and Justice”:

As we have seen with the virtues in general, the moral struggle is protracted. When arrangements have to be radically changed to promote justice and the true development of all, the task is complex and arduous. Discernment of needs is one element, but the Catechism mentions also discernment of the “narrow path” between cowardice and the violence which under the illusion of fighting evil only makes it worse (para. 1889, citing Centesimus Annus 25).

This is a significant observation in that there has been in parts of the Third World a movement which has inclined some people to think that violent opposition to unjust social systems would be justified at least in certain circumstances. Some theologians of liberation have tried to use an essentially Marxist paradigm or method of analysis of society and some of the ways in which the struggle for justice has been argued could give the impression that a type of class war justified by the Gospel could be a way forward. Such an approach has not been embraced; those who consider the situation so extreme as to legitimise violence have been urged to pause. John Paul II urges realism: those who think they possess the secret of a perfect system are not giving proper weight to the fact that all of us are affected by original sin and there is a danger that they will then treat that system like a “secular religion” and in practice may see no moral limits to the methods to be used to bring it about (CA 25).

Nor does the Gospel offer salvation only to the oppressed, as Maryvale explains:

When people think violence may be licit, they run the danger of considering the Gospel as their own possession, but, the Gospel is intended for all. This means that the oppressors too should have the Gospel preached to them, which is very difficult at gun point. Conversely those fighting on behalf of the oppressed would run the risk of seeing the real wrong always elsewhere, which would make their own continuing conversion to the Gospel difficult too.

The Catechism rightly points to the danger that a violent response can make things worse, even for the oppressed. This does not mean that violence is never justified against an oppressive government, but it does mean that it cannot be recommended as a normal or systematic response.

What it indicates as necessary is the principle of charity which involves the love of God and neighbour. Charity it describes as the “greatest social commandment” (para. 1889). It involves respect for others and their rights and requires the practice of justice… The point [to note] is that Christ did not use violence against the oppression of the Roman Empire or the Jewish establishment of the day. On the other hand, He did not ignore the injustices around Him. He called Zaccheus to conversion (Luke 19: 1-10), a collaborator of the Romans. He distinguished between the sin and the sinner. He appealed to conversion of heart and suffered rather than inflict suffering. He did not waver, but persevered. The struggle for international social justice needs to be carried on at all sorts of levels by careful discernment, by spreading accurate information about injustice so that peoples may appreciate (e.g. in the West) the extent to which they are involved in the support of corrupt and unjust regimes elsewhere and may change or force change.

Maryvale (and the Catechism) inspire us with this concluding paragraph to this section:

The Catechism ends this section by saying that we are not only to live according to charity, but that charity will make us capable of implementing its demands in justice. This is a fitting reminder that grace is needed for all virtue and that our love of neighbour has to be rooted in our love of God. Indeed, it is true openness to God which will enable us to detect the real demands of justice, which will purify our intentions and cause us to rectify our behaviour. Authentic love of God makes it possible for us to love our neighbour in an upright manner, both to foster temperance as to the methods we employ and fortitude to avoid giving way before sustained opposition.

Don’t we all need spiritual and moral conversion? Because of our human nature, it is necessary to remind ourselves constantly of this. The practice of charity (aptly described as the “greatest social commandment”) will help us to achieve the conversion we so badly need.

_____________________

³ Gaudium et Spes [Joy and Hope] was one of four Apostolic Constitutions arising from Vatican II. For clarity for a general audience, I do not always quote the Catechism title references exactly as it abbreviates titles in some cases (I give the full title in the first reference in each section). I also use “ref.” rather than “cf.”

⁴ Solidarity is dealt with in chapter 6 (e).

5.

Participation in Social Life

5 (a) The Nature and Basis of Authority in Society

The relevant Catechism paragraphs for this section are;

1897 “ Human society can be neither well-ordered nor prosperous unless it has some people invested with legitimate authority to preserve its institutions and to devote themselves as far as is necessary to work and care for the good of all (John XXIII Pacem in Terris 46).

By ‘authority’ one means the quality by virtue of which persons or institutions make laws and give orders to men, and expect obedience from them.”

1898 “Every human community needs an authority to govern it (ref. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei; Diuturnum illud). The foundation of such authority lies in human nature. It is necessary for the unity of the state. Its role is to ensure as far as possible the common good of the society.”

1899 “The authority required by the moral order derives from God: ‘Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgement’ (Romans 13: 1-2; ref. Peter 2: 13-17).”

Maryvale’s opening commentary for this section is: “we shall be looking at participation in social life [and] …in particular we shall examine the relationship between authority and the common good.” Under the heading “Bases of Political Authority,” Maryvale proceeds to give an historical overview of political authority and of political philosophy as follows:

In centuries gone by and in some parts of the world today, the question of the basis of state authority would not have been a matter of open debate. Monarchs ruled often with absolute powers to make and enforce binding laws and it was assumed or sometimes stated that they derived this authority from God to the point where they asserted a ‘divine right’ to rule. The only strong challenge to this might be if the Church declared a ruler to be excommunicated and released subjects from their duty of obedience, as happened with Elizabeth I in 1570.

In more recent times, governments have been set up by sheer military might and have enforced whatever laws they enacted by the same power. [Maryvale now comments on different views held about what government entails] For the philosopher Thomas Hobbes and for national security regimes today, government is essentially to protect people from criminals or invaders. For others, like Locke, it was really to protect the propertied from attack by those without. For Bentham and Mill it was to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number by interfering as little as possible in people’s lives. To fascists it was the means by which the nation’s strength was channelled to its leader to promote the interest of that people against others, while for Marxism - Leninism it was the means by which the working class through the Communist Party would destroy the bourgeoisie.

Maryvale then considers “The Church and the Basis of Political Authority.” It is notable that particular groups or ideologies are not championed over others in the Church’s approach.

The Catechism gives a brief synthesis of positions long held by the Church as to the proper bases of political authority. You will notice the contrast with the justifications offered. Citing John XXIII (PT 46) it puts forward the following bases for government, of people with legitimate authority to make laws and to preserve institutions, etc. (para. 1897):

*    the well-ordering of human society

*    the prosperity of society

*    the care of the good of all

Notice that authority should be legitimate, not seized. There is to be concern for order, prosperity, and for the good of all.

What strikes us, apart from the legitimate nature of the authority, is that government should care for all. The Catechism goes on to justify such authority on the grounds that human nature requires some such authority and that the unity of the state depends on it (para.1898). Then comes a critical principle: the role of this authority is “to ensure as far as possible the common good”. In other words, the good of certain individuals in power, of the property-owners at the expense of others, of nationals to the detriment of others in the state or in other states, of one class against others is not acceptable as a moral basis for government authority.

Maryvale then considers “The Divine Basis for Government”:

Here the Catechism remarks that the authority “required by the moral order derives from God” (para. 1899) and it refers to the letter to the Romans and the first letter of Peter to back up this claim and especially to call for obedience to authorities.

It needs to be understood that the New Testament writers made brief references to political authority. Obedience was commanded to “silence what fools are saying” (1 Peter 2:15), while Paul urged obedience, payment of taxes, and good citizenship, since some authority was needed to reward the good and to punish criminals (Romans 13: 1-7). The state is to serve God “for your benefit” (13: 4). Its authority comes from God, so that to rebel against it is to rebel against God (13: 1-2).

We need to note that the basis of political authority is given cursorily. There is enough to be able to say with confidence that the Church understands that God has willed political authority in principle. That does not mean it approves of whatever form of government takes in a particular time and place (para 1901). It is saying that there needs to be some legitimate authority “for your good”. The justification of government then can be said to be one of service of people, not of special interest groups, but of the common good of all.

It is opportune that we are reminded of the proper basis of authority in society, of its Divine origin from God, and particularly that authority should be exercised for the good of all.

5 (b) Obedience, Responsibility and the Limits of Authority

The relevant Catechism extracts are as follows:

1900 “The duty of obedience requires all to give due honour to authority, and to treat those who are charged to exercise it with respect, and, insofar as it is deserved, with gratitude and goodwill. Pope St Clement of Rome provides the Church’s most ancient prayer for political authorities (ref. as early as 1 Timothy 2: 1-2):

Grant to them Lord, health, peace, concord and stability, so that they may exercise without offence the sovereignty that you have given them. Master, heavenly King of the ages, you give glory, honour and power over the things of the earth to the sons of men. Direct, Lord, their counsel, following what is pleasing and acceptable in your sight, so that by exercising with devotion and in peace and gentleness the power that you have given to them, they may find favour with you (St Clement of Rome, Epistula ad Corinthios 61: SCh 167, 198-200).”

1901 “If authority belongs to the order established by God, ‘the choice of the political regime and the appointment of rulers are left to the free decision of the citizens’ (Gaudium et Spes 74 para. 3).”

“The diversity of political regimes is morally acceptable, provided they serve the legitimate good of the communities that adopt them. Regimes whose nature is contrary to the natural law, to the public order and to the fundamental rights of persons cannot achieve the common good of the nations on which they have been imposed.”

1902 “Authority does not derive its moral legitimacy from itself. It must not behave in a despotic manner, but must act for the common good as a ‘moral force based on freedom and a sense of responsibility’: (GS 74 para. 2)

A human law has the character of law to the extent that it accords with right reason, and thus derives from the eternal law. Insofar as it falls short of right reason it is said to be an unjust law, and thus has not so much the nature of law as of a kind of violence (St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, 93, 3, ad 2).”

1903 “Authority is exercised legitimately only when it seeks the common good of the group concerned and if it applies morally licit means to attain it. If rulers were to enact unjust laws or take measures contrary to the moral order, such arrangements would not be binding in conscience. In such a case, ‘authority breaks down completely and results in shameful abuse’ (Pacem in Terris 51).”

1904 “It is preferable that each power be balanced by other powers and by other spheres of responsibility which keep it within proper bounds. This is the principle of the ‘rule of law’, in which the law is sovereign, and not the arbitrary will of men (ref. Centesimus Annus 44).”

Maryvale opens its commentary on the above as follows: “We now turn more directly to the response which is due to political authorities. From what has been said, it is clear that it is not unquestioning obedience, but it is also clear that there is a definite duty to obey legitimate authority.” It expands on this topic under the heading “Duties Towards Government”:

Presuming government is legitimately established, there is a duty to give due honour (para. 1900). This certainly means respect and obedience, but it also implies a limit; the honour due to government must not take the place of God. Those powers which have tried to destroy religion have acted illegally and immorally.Although the Church acknowledges the right of government to be obeyed if it is legitimate, it does not lay down which form of government there should be, a matter left to the free decision of citizens (GS 74). The Church does not specify here any particular system, but all are acceptable provided they serve the legitimate good of the communities which adopt them (GS 74).

Maryvale then moves to consider the political responsibility of leaders for the people they serve under the heading “Government and the Common Good”:

This is a key principle of the Church’s social teaching. In contrast to some of the positions [we] examined … the Catechism insists that authority is not its own justification. It must not act despotically, but “for the common good” (para.1902); it is legitimate only when seeking the “common good” by morally acceptable means (para. 1903). We recall that the common good is the sum total of the social conditions which allow people … to attain their fulfilment more fully and more easily (GS 26).

Paul VI made it clear that political authority is not simply to sit back and allow the common good to develop as far as it can. Its responsibility is more positive; respecting the rights of individuals and groups, it “acts in such a way as to create effectively and for the well-being of all, the conditions required for attaining man’s true and complete good” (Octogesima Adveniens 46). It has final responsibility for the common good toward which it ought to encourage people to work.

This is very different from that of those who see government as basically staying out of social life to a great extent. It has further implications. Since the active attainment of the common good is its purpose, government which arises illegitimately, which does not respect human rights cannot achieve the common good (para. 1901). Moreover, where it is fostered, it has to be by morally upright means. Political authority then should act as a moral force, based on freedom and a sense of responsibility (GS 74).

Political authority in relation to law and regulation is examined by Maryvale in the section “Unjust Laws” and the contrast between the civil law and the moral law is emphasised.

Where a law is not according to right reason, it is unjust and has no binding force in conscience (paras. 1902-3). Where laws permit what is immoral, they are not to be taken up; should they command it, they are to be disobeyed. A civil law permitting abortion or euthanasia “ceases by that very fact to be a true, morally binding civil law” (Evangelium Vitae 74). The common good demands morally upright laws.

Yes, we citizens must obey legitimate government, as otherwise we could have anarchy. But government must be legitimate and work for the common good and avoid legislating unjust laws, i.e. laws against right reason.

5 (c) The Meaning of the Common Good

The following are the relevant Catechism paragraphs:

1905 “In keeping with the social nature of man, the good of each individual is necessarily related to the common good, which in turn can be defined only in reference to the human person:

Do not live entirely isolated, having retreated into yourselves, as if you were already justified, but gather instead to seek the common good together (Ep. Barnabae 4, 10: PG 2, 734).”

1906 “By common good is to be understood ‘the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily’ (Gaudium et Spes 26 para. 1; ref. 74, para. 1). The common good concerns the good of all. It calls for prudence from each, and even more from those who exercise the office of authority. It consists of three essential elements: [paras 1907-9 following]”

1907 “First, the common good presupposes respect for the person as such. In the name of the common good, public authorities are bound to respect the fundamental and inalienable rights of the human person. Society should permit each of its members to fulfil his vocation. In particular, the common good resides in the conditions for the exercise of the natural freedoms indispensable for the development of the human vocation, such as ‘the right to act according to a sound norm of conscience and to safeguard … privacy, and rightful freedom also in matters of religion’ (GS 26 para. 2).”

1908 “Second, the common good requires the social well-being and the development of the group itself. Development is the epitome of all social duties. Certainly, it is the proper function of authority to arbitrate, in the name of the common good, between various particular interests; but it should make accessible to each what is needed to live a truly human life: food clothing, health, work, education and culture, suitable information, the right to establish a family, and so on (ref. GS 26, para. 2).”

1909 “Finally, the common good requires peace, that is, the stability and security of a just order. It presupposes that authority should ensure by morally acceptable means the security of society and its members. It is the basis of the right to legitimate personal and collective defence.”

1910 “Each human community possesses a common good which permits it to be recognised as such; it is in the political community that its most complete realization is found. It is the role of the state to defend and promote the common good of civil society, its citizens and intermediate bodies.”

Maryvale, noting that the principle of the common good has already been referred to, reminds us of their definition of it.:

The definition given already is that the common good involves the total conditions needed for people to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily. It is based on man’s social nature (para.1905). The Catechism adds that the common good concerns the life of all (para. 1906).

Three essential elements of the common good are then singled out by Maryvale:

It presupposes respect for the person as such (para. 1907). Authorities are, therefore, to respect the fundamental and inalienable rights of the person. It goes on to mention three rights: the right to freedom of conscience, the right to privacy, and the right to rightful freedom of religion. The reason the word “rightful” is mentioned here is to exclude any right to conduct, for example, child or other human sacrifice. These rights are said to stem from natural freedoms necessary for man to live his vocation.

It [common good] requires the social well-being and development of the group. Authorities are to act as arbiters between groups for the common good. Yet, it is not just this mediating role which pertains to government. It has a more basic function of promoting and protecting fundamental human rights. The more important ones are noted. They touch a truly human life, food, clothing, health, work, education, the right to establish a family, etc.

The common good requires peace; people need some sort of stability and security. Everyone has a natural right to self-defence and the state has the obligation of giving protection.

Maryvale concludes by tying the principle of the common good into the one of subsidiarity already considered. It describes the role of the state as being to promote “the common good of individuals, in intermediary bodies […where it] does not either ignore those needs […] or interfere beyond what is needed in violation of the principle of subsidiarity.”

Yes, it is timely to be reminded of the concept of the ‘common good’, which governments must embrace and which entails “the sum total of social conditions” to help us as citizens “to reach our fulfilment more fully and more easily”. We must remember also that one of the essential elements of the common good presupposes “respect for the person as such”.

5 (d) The Universal Common Good and the Progress of Persons

Here are the relevant Catechism paragraphs:

1911 “Human interdependence is increasing and gradually spreading throughout the world. The unity of the human family, embracing people who enjoy equal natural dignity, implies a universal common good. This good calls for an organization of the community of nations able to ‘provide for the different needs of men; this will involve the sphere of social life to which belong questions of food, hygiene, education … and certain situations arising here and there, as for example … alleviating the miseries of refugees dispersed throughout the world, and assisting migrants and their families’ (Gaudium et Spes 84 para. 2).”

1912 “The common good is always oriented towards the progress of persons: ‘The order of things must be subordinate to the order of persons, and not the other way around’ (GS 26 para. 3). This order is founded on truth, built up in justice, and animated by love.”

Maryvale’s opening remarks are: “The concept of the common good is an old one in Catholic social teaching. More recently, it has been expanded to take into account the common good of all people, on an international scale.”

Under the heading “Inter-Dependence”, Maryvale describes the complex and international dimension of our relationships with others:

One of the factors we notice is that we are all inter-connected. In speaking of the social nature of the human person, we acknowledge our need of others. Other people have talents which we ourselves may lack. Countries also are inter-dependent, as we see more international cooperation.

The Catechism starts from the position of the equal dignity we all share (para. 1911). If we are all equal, we still need one another and complement one another. Being equal with one another means that we all share the same basic needs. Thus, there is a universal common good, based upon our natural dignity. A number of activities are noted in this connection; socially the need for hygiene, clothing, food, education, etc. There would also be situations of crisis, as with refugees needing transport or basic care. The same would apply to migrants. It can be seen that quite an organisation is needed to be able to attend to these responsibilities. Yet, it is precisely through such means that these elaborate international tasks have to be undertaken. The capacities of individuals and even of well-intentioned small groups would not be able to meet the demand upon them in such times of crisis.

Then Maryvale looks at “The Common Good and the Progress of Peoples,” elaborating on the Church’s teachings that progress and the common good goes beyond basic subsistence needs and also questioning the assumption that all progress works towards the common good.

The common good has been shown to involve an array of responsibilities, but all of them are directed towards ensuring the authentic progress of peoples. The Catechism repeats the principle of the hierarchy of values (para. 1912). This order of being, rather than having, is a principle which is hard to apply on the national scene. It is based on truth and justice and is animated by love.

It is not always easy to see what this means when considering problems on a world scale. However, it would seem to be the case that the truth to be recognised is twofold, namely, the reality of the situation as it is and also the truth of the meaning of human existence and our common vocation …

The truth of things as they stand internationally is that there is no automatic progress through technical development. John Paul II notes that many who have a great deal suffer from a reversal of the correct hierarchy of values and are not made better beings, for all the wealth they possess. By contrast, the “have nots” are hindered in their development as persons because they are victims of injustice and often do not have what is needed for basic living (Sollicitude rei Socialis [SRS] 28).

This means that progress and the promotion of the common good might require a radical redistribution of wealth (SRS 31). This is not confined to wealth as normally understood, but extends to technical skills and knowledge. These should not be “possessed” in such a way that other people are denied access to them (Centesimus Annus 31-32). In this way justice could be fostered.

However, the common good also needs to consider the earth’s resources and ecology. Maryvale notes that

… untrammelled exploitation of the earth’s resources cannot go ahead without careful reflection on the implications for the ecology of the earth (SRS 34). The common good requires that this too be protected (CA 39). Animating action for justice by love requires the virtue of solidarity, that “firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good”, to the good of all because “we are all really responsible for all” (SRS 38).

The progress of the peoples and the promotion of the common good demand an active solidarity, which recognises that the goods of the earth are meant for all, all should have proper access to them. This carries with it the recognition that there is a fundamental equality of all persons. In this way the order of things should be subordinated to the order of persons in a correct hierarchy of values (para. 1912).

Yes, the concept of the universal common good reminds us that the goods of this earth are not distributed equally, but that we all have an obligation to do our bit to effect a fair re-distribution thereof, and to stand in solidarity with our less well-off brethren.

5 (e) Our Responsibility in Social Life

The relevant Catechism paragraphs are 1913 to 1917.

1913 “‘Participation’ is the voluntary and generous engagement of a person in social interchange. It is necessary that all participate, each according to his position and role, in promoting the common good. This obligation is inherent in the dignity of the human person.”

1914 “Participation is achieved first of all by taking charge of the areas for which one assumes personal responsibility: by the care taken for the education of his family, by conscientious work, and so forth, man participates in the good of others and of society (Ref. Centesimus Annus 43).”

1915 “As far as possible citizens should take an active part in public life. The manner of this participation may vary from one country or culture to another. ‘One must pay tribute to those nations whose systems permit the largest possible number of the citizens to take part in public life in a climate of genuine freedom’ (Gaudium et Spes 31 para.3).”

1916 “As with any ethical obligation, the participation of all in realizing the common good calls for a continually renewed conversion of the social partners. Fraud and other subterfuges, by which some people evade the constraints of the law and the prescriptions of societal obligation, must be firmly condemned because they are incompatible with the requirements of justice. Much care should be taken to promote institutions that improve the conditions of human life (ref. GS 30 para.1).”

1917 “It is incumbent on those who exercise authority to strengthen the values that inspire the confidence of the members of the group and encourage them to put themselves at the service of others. Participation begins with education and culture. ‘One is entitled to think that the future of humanity is in the hands of those who are capable of providing the generations to come with reasons for life and optimism’ (GS 31 para. 3).”

In its opening commentary, Maryvale reminds us of the importance of participation in social life, observing that it “is a major plank in the Church’s understanding of how the human person should develop and contribute to the well-being of others at home and abroad.” Under the heading, “Participation-”, Maryvale elaborates on this issue.

The right and responsibility to participate actively in society has been seen to be a requirement of human nature, a means of enabling personal qualities to grow and of serving others. The Catechism stresses that it is “the voluntary and generous engagement of the person in social interchange” (para.1913). The way we participate and the extent to which we participate may vary considerably, but through it we contribute to the common good, which is a social duty.

This voluntary and generous participation touches areas of personal responsibility first such as the family and work. Caring for the family, includingtheir education, and working conscientiously, man participates in the good of others and of society (para.1914).

Participation extends also to political life. The Catechism praises those countries which have many people participating. For most people in the West this would be through elections of parliamentary candidates. Paul VI acknowledged that the growth of modern technocracy made life more complex and decisions in some ways more difficult. Nevertheless, he argued that there was a need not only to become better informed, but to be more involved in a shared responsibility (OA 47). This participation has the advantage that it involves citizens in the political process and reduces the danger of exploitation.

Then Maryvale considers the moral aspects of this engagement with society under the heading “Participation and Morality”:

Conversion is always possible and necessary if the common good is to be realised. This is to involve the various social partners. Thus, fraud and other means of avoiding social obligations are condemned as incompatible with the requirements of justice (para. 1916). Such violations of social responsibility would include disregarding the speed limit, as a lack of concern for the life of other people as well as oneself (GS 30). These social obligations now concern the whole world and should not be underestimated in terms of their importance. They are the means by which our duties in justice to others are fulfilled.

This responsibility on a global scale and within our own nations is greatly inspired by our vocation as Christians. It is not something apart from our faith. As the parable of the Good Samaritan reveals, our neighbour is not just the person we know, but is anyone in need. In our age this has to include those faraway in faraway places. Thus, endeavouring to participate in social life and to discharge our serious social responsibilities is not just a matter of secular justice, but a requirement of the Gospel and of solidarity with the needy (GS 32). The preferential option for the poor does not mean ignoring the needs of other people; it means attending first to the needs of the poorest, since they are the most urgent.

Maryvale concludes by incorporating the need for education about this moral responsibility:

The practice of participation and of care for the poor through this process is something which will demand education and inspiration (para. 1917). In many respects people are not used to it as a moral responsibility and so education is necessary. The development of people’s potential, providing them with an opportunity to serve others and to contribute to the common good (GS 75) are all valid aims. Political authorities, the Church and other bodies have the task of encouraging people to become involved in these ways to show solidarity and to foster the authentic human development of all.

Indeed, we all have a responsibility to be active in our societies, rather than assuming that others will do this or criticising our politicians for the problems in our society. We have a shared responsibility and the Catechism counsels “voluntary and generous engagement” reminding us that “conversion is always possible and necessary if the common good is to be realised”.

6.

Social Justice

6 (a) Social Justice, Human Dignity and Basic Human Rights

The relevant sections of the Catechism are as follows:

1928 “Society ensures social justice when it provides the conditions that allow associations or individuals to obtain what is their due, according to their nature and their vocation. Social justice is linked to the common good and the exercise of authority.”

1929 “Social justice can be obtained only in respecting the transcendent dignity of man. The person represents the ultimate end of society, which is ordered to him:

What is at stake is the dignity of the human person, whose defence and promotion have been entrusted to us by the Creator, and to whom the men and women at every moment of history are strictly and responsibly in debt (John Paul II , Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 47).”

1930 “Respect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow from his dignity as a creature. These rights are prior to society and must be recognised by it. They are the basis of moral legitimacy of every authority: by flouting them, or refusing to recognize them in its positive legislation, a society undermines its own moral legitimacy (ref. John XXIII, Pacem in Terris 65). If it does not respect them, authority can rely only on force or violence to obtain obedience from its subjects. It is the Church’s role to remind men of goodwill of these rights, and to distinguish them from unwarranted or false claims.”

Maryvale’s opening comments here are: “We have been giving consideration to the relationship between the person and society and to the importance of social life. We now turn to the last part … in which we shall address the general moral questions of social justice.”

Examining the “The place of Social Justice”, Maryvale notes that it is an evocative issue but also one that needs to be clearly delineated:

It is no exaggeration to say that social justice is a question which has attracted a great deal of interest in our age, a topic which can often elicit passionate reactions, especially from the young. It could even be said to be one of the “signs of the times” (Gaudium et Spes 4) in the sense that it is one of the key indicators of the sensitivities of people of our age. Reactions to gross violations of human dignity are often associated with calls for justice and equality between persons and peoples (GS 30).

The Catechism begins by alluding to the classic axiom of justice we have seen earlier, suum cuique (to each his own). Society ensures social justice when it “provides the conditions which allow associations or individuals to obtain what is their due” (para. 1928). At this very general level the principle is necessarily vague, but the Catechism tries to put some flesh on it: everyone’s due is related to his nature and vocation. Social justice is related also to the common good and to the exercise of authority. Before looking at these points in more detail, we will summarise their relevance as follows:

* To each his due related to nature indicates that social justice must seek to establish respect for those rights which are ours precisely because we are human beings, rights which derive from our very nature as distinct from rights we have acquired by contracts or agreements.

* To each his due related to vocation indicates that we are not only created, but we have a destiny and a calling. This is true even of those who do not believe in God. It is a matter of social justice to allow everyone to recognise and pursue their true vocation, which is always a morally upright one. Were anyone to claim respect for a ‘calling’ to amass wealth by extortion, etc., this could not be a true vocation, but a distorted one! This should not command respect.

* To each his due related to the common good means that no-one has rights to selfishness. We can see the truth of this point as flowing from our essentially social nature and also from our being created in God’s image. God has not intended that we should live in isolation. Much less has He intended that we live by exploiting other people for our own self-centred purposes. Keeping in mind the importance of the common good will help us to keep from a selfishness which ignores or manipulates others, or a selfishness of one group or sector of society against another. In fact, the logic of the principle “to each his due” is the recognition of the rights of other persons. There is no reason to restrict this to individuals and by implication it touches the rights of groups, societies and nations.

* To each his due related to authority involves recalling that authority is not an end in itself, but entails the legitimate exercise of power in the service of others, in the service of their true needs, among the most basic of which would be the right to justice. Rights arising from our nature are not then granted by any earthly authority, but that authority will only be properly exercised if it recognises and protects basic rights, especially those arising from our nature.

Maryvale continues under the heading “Human Dignity and Social Justice”, noting examples of when human dignity has been denied by political leaders and reminding us that our equality stems from God himself.

The simple statement that social justice ‘can be obtained only in respecting the transcendent dignity of man’ (para. 1929) is absolutely crucial. Most people will see the truth of it easily, even if they have never considered it in these terms before. But it may be worth reflecting upon instances where it has been deliberately ignored or explicitly denied. Where a group of people is officially classified as sub-human (Unter-menschen), as were the Jews, Slavs and Romany (“gypsies”) in Nazi Germany, it means that their essential humanity is being denied and any claims they might have to be beneficiaries of social justice are already rejected. Any scheme of social justice in such a society will always exclude them.

Again, people designated as “class enemies” by Communist governments were likewise devoid of any human rights. Whether on racial, nationalist or social bases, de-classification of a group of people as human means a rejection of their human dignity and of their human rights.

Where people believe in God, there is at least the basic belief in creation which should guard us against such attitudes. This means belief in God as our Creator. He has entrusted to us the care of our fellow human beings. A basic equality and fundamental rights which express, promote and protect it are then implied for any who recognise God in this way. This means too that, for Christians, excluding certain social, racial groups is incompatible with their faith. The equality of all people as created by God for a common destiny has a theological basis in our creation in God’s image.

Maryvale now considers another dimension of human dignity, that of “Human Dignity and Human Rights”:

‘Respect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow from his dignity as a creature’ (para. 1930). Notice that rights as a creature means recognising the limitations of the human person; in other words, it means realising that we are not self-sufficient, we are not gods … it is not harmful to us to recognise this basic truth about our limitations. People who operate as if they were not creatures are deluding themselves; after all, they cannot overcome death and they cannot ensure the lasting significance of anything they do. And the other side of the coin is that those who do recognise this limit of being creatures are freed from the untruth of self-deception and can collaborate with God towards achieving their vocation and true human progress.

The inter-connection between human dignity and human rights means that governments are to be at the service of both. The rights which flow from man’s dignity as a creature are those which fall into the first category above, his natural or fundamental rights, rights which governments do not create or concede, but which they are morally bound to recognise (para. 1930). The principle of respect for human rights is the standard for judging whether or not governments are promoting and protecting social justice or acting in violation of it (John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis [RH]17).

And Maryvale continues to probe this human rights issue further, arguing that it is the true respect for human rights that actually legitimates the state:.

Now it is not just about seeing whether or not human rights are respected, but the moral basis for the authority of the state is at issue too. (para. 1930).

We saw … that Government exists to create freedom, to foster human dignity, and to promote the common good. “The common good that the authority in the state serves is brought to full realization only when all the creatures are sure of their rights” (RH 17) … Put another way, without active respect for basic human rights, talk of human dignity is empty and hypocritical. Without respect for basic human rights, the authority of the state loses its justification. Without respect for basic human rights, the common good is not being served, but only the partial good of some individuals or groups at the expense of everyone else. Thus, without respect for basic human rights, social justice simply does not exist.

These are very profound statements concerning the true basis of political authority. Maryvale goes on to consider the implications for political leaders of not respecting human rights.

Where basic human rights are not respected, where they are not incorporated into legislation and so made the basis of the way the state operates, not only does the state undermine its own right to rule, but it can only rely then on force or violence to exact obedience from people. It is, therefore, no surprise that governments which violate human rights in a serious way often serve a group interest and not the common good and they have to rely on military power, intimidation and manipulation to survive. They rely on power and they have no authority.

Maryvale notes that the Church does intervene or speak out in situations where human rights are denied, observing that “she has done so more explicitly and systematically than ever in this century” and proceeding to consider the issue of false claims to rights.

The Catechism makes a further important point, that there is also the need to avoid false claims to rights(para. 1930) in our age. This is because people have become so used to asserting their own rights that it is often taken for granted that this is the way to achieve what we want to achieve. People assert “rights” which may not be rights at all. An example would be the “right” of a woman to do whatever she wants with her own body (including, it is often claimed, having her unborn baby aborted). In fact, she has no right to do what she likes with her own body; no more has a man that right. Much less has she the right deliberately to destroy innocent life within her.

Maryvale gives a further example concerning personal property that may surprise many of us.

Another false claim would be the claim of an industrialist to do what he likes with his own property without further ado. He does not have such a right. There is a moral responsibility of social justice to use what we have for the common good of people in our country and throughout the world. In other words, he does not have an unlimited right of this sort. The habit of merely asserting rights not only risks thoughtlessness, but it can risk selfishness in which it becomes a cloak for demanding what we want, individually or as a group, without regard for or at the expense of others in need.

This clarification might cause many of us to consider how appropriately we are using our own resources. Expanding from that point allows Maryvale to conclude that:

Social justice does not exist without respect for human dignity and its essential rights, but so-called ‘human rights’ will degenerate into selfishness without a true concern to promote and respect social justice.”

For social justice to flourish, the dignity of each person must be respected, as must also his/her human rights. And thus the concept of “to each his due” is important, and in this context we are reminded that authority entails the legitimate exercise of power in the service of others.

6 (b) Social Justice and Love of Neighbour

The following are the relevant Catechism paragraphs:

1931 “Respect for the human person proceeds by way of respect for the principle that ‘everyone should look upon his neighbour (without any exception) as ‘another self’, above all bearing in mind his life and the means necessary for living it with dignity’ (Gaudium et Spes 27 para. 1). No legislation could by itself do away with the fears, prejudices, and attitudes of pride and selfishness which obstruct the establishment of truly fraternal societies. Such behaviour will cease only through the charity that finds in every man a ‘neighbour’, a brother.”

1932 “The duty of making oneself a neighbour to others and actively serving them becomes even more urgent when it involves the disadvantaged, in whatever area this may be. ‘As you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me’ (Matthew 25: 40).”

1933 “This same duty extends to those who think or act differently from us. The teaching of Christ goes so far as to require the forgiveness of offences. He extends the commandment of love, which is that of the New Law, to all enemies (ref. Matthew 5: 43-44). Liberation in the spirit of the Gospel is incompatible with hatred of one’s enemy as a person, but not with hatred of the evil that he does as an enemy.”

In its opening commentary, Maryvale advises us that in this section we consider the previous section’s concerns of social justice and human rights in the context of “love of neighbour”. Maryvale reminds us too that, as part of our Catechism course, we have already encountered the New Testament commandment “to love our neighbour as ourselves” and the new commandment of John’s Gospel “to love one another as Christ has loved us”. Asking how love of neighbour affects “social justice and human rights”, Maryvale recalls two points from the Catechism and then goes on to interrogate the true meaning of those points:

To respect everyone’s rights as a requirement of social justice involves looking on our neighbour (without any exception) as another self, especially considering his life and the means necessary for living it in a dignified manner (para. 1931 citing GS 27).Legislation can only achieve so much. It cannot remove fear, prejudice, pride, selfishness, and so on. Therefore charity is needed to see everyone as a brother.

In a sense this is a paradox because it suggests that to live a life which promotes mere justice is not enough. To think of other people as deserving justice, equally and without exception … we are invited to think of them as ourselves. This is the very opposite of the way we do think of other people when we exclude them from society by calling them, or effectively treating them, as Untermenschen, sub-human outcasts.

The Catechism touches on a very important point here … the teaching of Jesus was not just concerned about the external action or about fulfilling the minimum required by the Decalogue [Ten Commandments]. He sought a morality based on interior dispositions from which morally upright behaviour would arise, like good fruit from a good tree. The same is true here in that social justice, and the active respect for human rights which it involves, are not likely to arise from nowhere. The attitudes we allow to fester inside or the virtuous attitudes we try to nurture will make it harder or easier to treat our fellow human beings with the respect they deserve. Social justice is not just about what we do; it stems from the way we consider others, esteem them or despise them.

It is for this reason too that civil legislation is not enough. Although it is necessary and right for our basic human rights to be asserted and protected by law, the law of the land cannot be the guardian of all morality. It can and should seek to direct and limit our external behaviour to preclude gross abuses of basic human rights, but it cannot dictate how people feel or seek to control our minds. To think of other people as other selves and as brothers is a moral challenge. To do that is already to alter the way we will act towards them. No-one who truly considers another as another self or a brother will violate his basic rights. This will lead to social justice.

Maryvale then considers our duty (both local and global) towards the poorest and most disadvantaged in our world under its heading “Social Justice and Love of the Poor”:

It is often crises of famine or of refugees fleeing war or persecution which raise questions of international social justice at a very dramatic level. In our own country⁵ too, it is often cases of terrible social deprivation and of exploitation which are the spark for renewed concern about social justice. Such instances seem to give a vivid demonstration of serious neglect or, more usually, of serious violation, of basic human rights. Those most at risk are the poor, the weak and the defenceless, the modern-day equivalents of the poor, the orphan and the widow seen to be most in danger in earlier times (Leviticus 19: 9-15, 25: 5-7; Deuteronomy 24:10-15, 19-22). The poor are especially dear to Christ (see Luke 6: 20, 16: 19-31). That they are least able to defend themselves and are most vulnerable to the effects of national disasters or to distress of human origin means their rights and dignity are most in danger.

The Catechism proclaims that “the duty of making oneself a neighbour to others is more urgent when it involves the disadvantaged” (para. 1932). Here the question of social justice again requires that we see ourselves as other selves and brothers to those in need even if far away, but it moves beyond this insofar as these people are especially needy and their need is urgent. They have a special claim on our care. Justice which treated all cases of need as the same or dealt with them on a “first come first served” basis would do great harm to those whose need cannot wait. It is here we can speak about a preferential option for the poor, though the Catechism does not use this term here.

Of course, the Catechism does not suggest that only the poor are deserving of our love and charity. Maryvale reminds us that oppressors and those who are not poor also deserve our consideration.

One of the dangers noticed was that the oppressors need to hear the Gospel and be converted too. If we talk of a preferential option for the poor, it cannot mean that the rich and those not so poor are excluded from our consideration. Love of neighbour has to be universal; all of us need love and all of us need the love of Christ, who himself took time, according to Luke’s parable, to convert the oppressive and wealthy Zaccheus from his injustice. Given the “special form of poverty which consists in being deprived of fundamental human rights” (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 42), the “option or love of preference for the poor” is “a special form of primacy in the exercise of Christian charity”, so that their needs should have priority in political and economic decisions and in our hearts.

Being able to differentiate between the sin and the sinner is considered by Maryvale under “Love of Enemies and Human Rights.” We are reminded that we should not be selective about whom we love:

The Catechism simply summarises a distinction basic to Christianity rooted in the Gospel (e.g. see John 8: 1-11) between love of the sinner and hatred of the sin. We are called to love our enemies. The contrast in Matthew’s Gospel between “You have heard how it was said: ‘Love your friends and hate your enemies’” and “But I say to you: ‘Love your enemies …”‘ (Matthew 5: 42-44), is in fact a contrast between the way people of the time lived their moral lives by and large, and Christ’s new law.

We … are too often selective about those we will love. In our personal lives and in social morality the danger of treating some persons or groups as outcasts remains. If we have been wronged badly and the injustice continues, it is natural to be very annoyed, but we ought to shun the sin, avoid becoming sinful in turn by giving way to spite, hatred or vengeance, and love the sinner by at least praying for his true well-being. Nor must we exclude reconciliation, should he see his sin and repent.

The foregoing prods us into taking stock as to how well we perform on this great social commandment of charity “to love our neighbour as well as our enemies”, and above all not to be selective in those we love. Legislation on its own will never substitute for what can come only from the heart.

6 (c) Basic Human Equality and Legitimate Differences

Here are the relevant Catechism paragraphs:

1934 “Created in the image of the one God and equally endowed with rational souls, all men have the same nature and the same origin. Redeemed by the sacrifice of Christ, all are called to participate in the same divine beatitude: all therefore enjoy an equal dignity.”

1935 “The equality of men rests essentially on their dignity as persons and the rights that flow from it:

Every form of social or cultural discrimination in fundamental personal rights on the grounds of sex, race, colour, social conditions, language or religion, must be curbed and eradicated as incompatible with God’s design (Gaudium et Spes 29 para. 2).”

1936 “On coming into the world, man is not equipped with everything he needs for developing his bodily and spiritual life. He needs others. Differences appear tied to age, physical abilities, intellectual or moral aptitudes, the benefits derived from social commerce, and the distribution of wealth (ref. GS 29 para. 2). The ‘talents’ are not distributed equally (ref. Matthew 25: 14-30; Luke 19: 11-27).”

1937 “These differences belong to God’s plan, who wills that each receive what he needs from others, and that those endowed with particular ‘talents’ share the benefits with those who need them. These differences encourage and often oblige persons to practise generosity, kindness and sharing of goods; they foster the mutual enrichment of cultures:

I distribute the virtues quite diversely; I do not give all of them to each person, but some to one, some to others … I shall give principally charity to one; justice to another; humility to this one, a living faith to that one … And so I have given many gifts and graces, both spiritual and temporal, with such diversity that I have not given everything to one single person, so that you may be constrained to practice charity towards one another … I have willed that one should need another and that all should be my ministers in distributing the graces and gifts they have received from me (St Catherine of Siena, The Dialogue of St Catherine of Siena 1, 7)⁶.”

Maryvale’s opening commentary for this section notes that this issue has been touched upon “in relation to the preferential option for the poor” and observes that this “is an important issue because there are some cases where absolute equality would seem wrong”. Maryvale proceeds to examine this in more detail under the heading “The Bases of our Equality”:

First of all, let us recall that there is a fundamental equality of all men and women which has its basis in a number of factors (para. 1934 based on Gaudium et Spes 29) [Maryvale then lists seven such equalities]:

We are all equal because we are created in the image and likeness of God. This means that our equality rests in the fact that we are all creatures, dependent for our existence upon God’s creative act of love, as well as the love of our parents.

Our equality can be said to include that fact that we are not our own architects and we are not supreme; we depend on God.

We are equal too in being the summit of God’s creation, so that there is a radical difference between us and the nearest animals, a qualitative difference. The image and likeness of God enables us freely to know and love Him. The spiritualdimension of our beings unites us as equals, but distinguishes us from other creatures.

We are all equal in having rational souls. This old expression refers to our being able to think, to reflect on our world and on our selves, a capacity not matched in the rest of creation.

We are equal in having the same nature which is a human nature. Thus, we are not just spiritual beings, but we exist on earth in our bodies which form part of the persons we are. Nor are we just bodily beings, since we have a spiritual dimension by which we can relate to God in the communion of prayer and receive Him into ourselves (ref. GS 14; John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio, 11).

We have the same origin which is a divine one insofar as we receive the gift of life from God who creates us, and it is also a human one insofar as the gametes of our parents united to collaborate with the Divine action (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum Vitae, Intr. 5). This remains true even of those cases where, on a human level, the origin was sinful (as in rape, fornication, adultery, and so on). God does not will the sinful human origin, but He does not interfere with the laws of procreation He has established, and He does will the new child.

We are equal in having been redeemed by Christ. Although only Christians acknowledge this in faith, it is true of all who are saved that they are saved in Christ, there being no other name in heaven or on earth by which we can be saved (Acts [of the Apostles] 4: 12; [Catechism] paras 846-848).

We are equal in our vocation to beatitude, the fullness of life in Christ. We have seen that this is the calling of all.

Maryvale then considers “Equality and Basic Human Rights” reminding us that God has created each one of us and therefore each individual has a dignity which, whatever our differences, we must always respect.

These factors [we have just looked at] make human dignity so important, demanding full respect. Whatever our sex, age, colour, or faith, we are persons created by God and called to share His life (see GS 27). Our basic dignity is to be respected by individuals and by governments as fundamental to social justice.

It is this basic dignity which remains in people who are mentally ill, terminally ill and dependent on others, and in prisoners, despite their wrong-doing. Discrimination which violates any of these rights is “incompatible with God’s design” (GS 29). It is respect for human dignity which lies behind the recognition of natural or basic human rights. Hence religious liberty is based on the conviction that persons must be free to seek and pursue the truth as they are able to grasp it (Dignitatis Humanae 1-2).

Respect for handicapped persons is an issue of note when so many are prepared to think of them as useless. It is precisely the fact that a human person is not to be judged on the basis of what he can produce or do which underlines this unique dignity. Social justice is gravely infringed when persons are rejected on these grounds or on grounds that they will be a burden to others (ref. Evangelium Vitae 57-58). Equality of dignity demands not only an end to political and social discrimination, but also a struggle against the gross economic inequalities which prevent people having access to the basic things they need to sustain life (GS 29).

Then Maryvale deals with the topic “Legitimate Differences and Unjust Discrimination,” noting that equality of access may need to be restricted in particular cases where specific skills are required or where others need to be protected.

While many people of goodwill accept the need for basic human rights and acknowledge human dignity as fundamental, they also see that there are instances of rightful “discrimination” which do not violate human dignity. Talents are not distributed equally (paras 1936-37) and we should share our gifts, put them at the disposal of others. St. Catherine of Siena sees the distribution of gifts as providential; since no one person has all the talents, we all need one another and this is a stimulus to charity (ref. para. 1937).

To give a straightforward example, a patient would have the right to expect that one operating on him was a properly trained surgeon and not a general member of the public claiming an “equal right” to operate! Expertise is necessary to protect lives when gas or electricity works are necessary. It would be ludicrous for someone to expect to play an instrument in a major orchestra who had but a rudimentary knowledge and ability.

Discrimination is further justified when there are special needs, as there would be if there were a major epidemic; people might be quarantined, but only where there was genuine need and careful attention to the nature of the disease and the true danger of a suspect being infected.

And Maryvale continues with a consideration of particularly vulnerable groups:

Even where a person has his human rights restricted properly, as with a convicted criminal, they must be restricted only to the extent necessary for the common good and for his own well-being. The rightful restrictions upon his liberty do not justify trying to destroy his personality, to exploit his yearning for freedom by inducing him to be a guinea-pig in medical or surgical procedures etc. He remains a human person with dignity.

It has long been the teaching of moral theologians that, if there is doubt about whether or not we are dealing with a human person, the safer course is to be followed, as the only prudent (morally responsible) option. Thus some have questioned whether or not the human embryo is a person. Whatever our opinion, the fact that there might be a true personal life (there certainly is genetically unique human life from conception) lies behind the doctrine that the human being is to be treated as a person from conception (Donum Vitae 1,1).

Because of the special beings that we humans are in God’s creation, we all have a basic human equality that should never be denied us, no matter what our station or condition in life is. So the handicapped, the terminally ill, and those who might be regarded as a burden on society, are equal in their basic rights as compared to the healthy and productive members of society. Governments must realise this.

6 (d) Sinful Inequalities

The following is the relevant Catechism paragraph:

1938 “There exist also sinful inequalities that affect millions of men and women. These are in open contradiction of the Gospel:

Their equal dignity as persons demands that we strive for fairer and more humane conditions. Excessive economic and social disparity between individuals and peoples of the one human race is a source of scandal and militates against social justice, equity, human dignity, as well as social and international peace (Gaudium et Spes [GS] 29 Para. 3).”

Maryvale comments: “While there are legitimate forms of discrimination based on abilities or dangers where those abilities or dangers are directly relevant, it is obvious that more radical discrimination, violating basic human rights, is morally reprehensible.” Then under the heading “Inequalities and the Gospel,” Maryvale proceeds to consider “some of the worst forms of discrimination” identified by the Catechism. The first of these is that of “Excessive Economic Disparity”

A major principle of the Church’s social teaching has been that the resources of the earth and, more generally, of the universe are essentially gifts from God to the whole of humanity. The vocation to “subdue the face of the earth” (Genesis 1: 28) is a common vocation and represents the essentially positive role of work, work through which the human person not only develops those resources, but develops himself (GS 34); “man becomes more truly man” (Laborem Exercens [LE] 9).

The right of private property, though justified as it fosters initiative, responsibility and commitment, is subordinate to the principle of the universal destiny of the goods of the earth (LE 14; Centesimus Annus [CA]31). Ownership of the means of production is licit when it serves work to enable people to use what has been given for the well-being of all; when ownership is left unused, is used to impede such work or for illicit speculation, etc., it “has no justification and is an abuse in the sight of God and man” (CA 42).

Next, Maryvale considers the inequality of “Excessive Social Disparity”:

Social disparity results from excessive economic disparity in many ways. It occurs when capitalism ignores its social responsibilities and when workers are left without proper rights, when wages are unjust, etc. In Marxism-Leninism and in “real” socialism (i.e. socialism as lived) the domination of the party led to an elite of privilege with the majority of the population denied basic rights to information, to share in the decisions about their future, etc. in a totalitarian state.

Other social disparities arise from racial divisions. The worst form is genocide, but where peoples of other races and cultures have settled for work, there have often been illicit forms of discrimination with people being allocated jobs or housing, etc. not on the basis of need or availability, but of race.

Our century has also become alert to unjustified sexual discrimination, as when women have done the same work as men and have been paid less, or when they have been denied access to jobs of which they are capable.

Maryvale concludes this section with some brief comments on the topic “Inequalities and the Threat to Peace”:

The Catechism notes the danger to peace of sinful inequalities. The more serious the discrimination and the more it threatens the very livelihood of people, the more likely it is they will resort to violence if they see no other way of rectifying the injustice. Peace is the fruit of justice, conflict that of injustice.

As the world’s resources are essentially gifts from God to the whole of humanity, we are reminded once again of our obligations to help in rectifying the economic and social disparities existing throughout the world. And we might remind ourselves of the terrible social disparity of a racial nature which can give rise to horrors such as genocide; and maybe recall that horrible genocide which occurred in Rwanda twenty years ago. We might even ask ourselves what, if anything, did I do to prevent this horror?

6 (e) The Principle of Solidarity

Here are the relevant Catechism paragraphs:

1939 “The principle of solidarity, also articulated in terms of ‘friendship’ or ‘social charity’, is a direct demand of human and Christian brotherhood (ref. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis [SRS] 38-40; Centesimus Annus [CA] 10).

An error, ‘today abundantly widespread, is disregard for the law of human solidarity and charity, dictated and imposed both by our common origin and by the equality in rational nature of all men, whatever nation they belong to. This law is sealed by the sacrifice of redemption offered by Jesus Christ on the altar of the Cross to his heavenly Father, on behalf of sinful humanity’ (Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, 20 October 1939: Acta Apostolicae Sedis 31(1939), 423 ff.).”

1940 “Solidarity is manifested in the first place by the distribution of goods and remuneration for work. It also presupposes the effort for a more just social order where tensions are better able to be reduced and conflicts more readily settled by negotiation.”

1941 “Socio-economic problems can be resolved only with the help of all forms of solidarity: solidarity of the poor among themselves, between rich and poor, of workers among themselves, between employers and employees in a business, solidarity among nations and peoples. International solidarity is a requirement of the moral order; world peace depends in part upon this.”

1942 “The virtue of solidarity goes beyond material goods. In spreading the spiritual goods of the faith, the Church has promoted, and often opened new paths for, the development of temporal goods as well. And so throughout the centuries has the Lord’s saying been verified: ‘Seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well’ (Matthew 6: 33):

For two thousand years this sentiment has lived and endured in the soul of the Church, impelling souls then and now to the heroic charity of monastic farmers, liberators of slaves, healers of the sick, and messengers of faith, civilization, and science to all generations and all peoples for the sake of creating the social conditions capable of offering to everyone possible a life worthy of man and of a Christian (Pius XII, Discourse, 1 June 1941).”

Maryvale opens this section by noting that the principle of solidarity “is not a product of the Polish Solidarity movement or an invention of a Polish Pope” but actually “a principle clearly noted in Vatican II (Gaudium et Spes 32) [which...] goes back to Pius XII (20th Oct., 1939; see footnote 46 in the Catechism [para. 1939]).”

Then Maryvale goes on to look at “The Bases of Solidarity”:

This principle is based on the same sources as our basic equality to a great extent. Pius XII noted our common origin, our common rational nature and the redemption of sinful humanity by Christ. John Paul II calls solidarity a direct demand of human and Christian brotherhood (SRS 38-40); in other words he takes it to be applicable to all mankind irrespective of whether people hold religious beliefs or not, but he also takes it to be a specific demand of Christian morality …

Following this, Maryvale examines “The Scope of the Principle of Solidarity,” explaining that this wide-ranging principle covers:

the distribution of goods
the remuneration of work
efforts for a more just social order
the reduction of conflicts through negotiation
the collaboration of various social groups
a solidarity of faith in charitable activity (paras 1940-42)

As a force in the economy, there is no doubt that solidarity developed among workers where capitalism had degenerated into a means of acquiring money with little regard for the essential rights and dignity of the workers, but in the face of the degradation of mass unemployment it is needed all the more to combat what threatens the person of the worker (Laborem Exercens [LE] 8).

In terms of the distribution of goods, it must be said that the theory of inevitable class conflict between owners and workers is misplaced. Work, which should develop the humanity of all who subdue the face of the earth, needs capital in the sense of money and resources and it needs labour, so that there is an inextricable link between them (LE 13). In fact, the redistribution of wealth is effected through just wages, but social security for those in need, such as the unemployed, is also an obligation deriving from the right of all to the fruits of the earth. Solidarity among the workers should never be a solidarity of man against man, but should be a solidarity for justice (LE 20).

Maryvale continues its consideration of solidarity by stressing the respect and peaceful means by which true solidarity is achieved:

Solidarity as seeking a more just social order in a country [...]involves respect for the rights of others, accepting responsibility for the weaker people without robbing them of initiative, and promoting the common good (SRS 39). On an international level, solidarity means looking on poorer nations not in terms of exploitation, but of sharing and cooperation, respecting their different cultures (SRS 39). This entails the co-operation of various social groups and nations.

Insofar as solidarity is about reducing conflicts, it involves collaboration by peaceful means. The reduction of exploitation and injustice which it ought to foster will help contribute to peace because the reasons for fighting will have been reduced. As Pius XII taught that peace could only be present with justice (opus iustitiae pax), so John Paul points to solidarity as the root of peace, since it means combating injustice. The saying thus becomes opus solidaritatis pax (peace is the work of solidarity). Settling conflicts by negotiation is a valuable benefit of solidarity in practice as people learn to respect one another and so become more able and willing to work together for the common good.

Finally, the end of this Maryvale section is also a fitting end to this book. It reminds us that solidarity is an active virtue, which is expressed through justice and humanity but is directed by and towards the true love of God.

Thinking back to the Catechism teaching on virtue, solidarity as a social virtue is more than a vague compassion; it is a “firm and persevering determination” to be committed to “the common goodof all” (SRS 28). This is in marked contrast to the mere desire for profit or a thirst for power.

As a religious virtue, solidarity goes beyond this promotion of justice. It gives concrete expression to charity, involves forgiveness and is directed towards the creation of communion with other people and in Christ (SRS 40). It is precisely in this context that solidarity has worked for the spread of spiritual goods, caring for the sick, spreading the Gospel through missionary activity. Here we can perhaps see how solidarity as well as being a human virtue going beyond justice, becomes a theological virtue rooted in and orientated to charity, in fact to self-giving love of God and of neighbour which is fulfilled in communion (ibid.).

It would probably be fair to say that the practice of solidarity is the acid test of how concerned or otherwise we are for the less well endowed people in society or around the world. Are we prepared to be seen standing shoulder high with them? Surely, it would be wonderful for humankind, in the context of its joyful and fulfilling existence, if individually, collectively, nationally and internationally, we could all embrace and successfully put into practice, the great virtue of Christian solidarity.

I hope that the sentiments expressed in this chapter and throughout the book have been helpful to you. Compiling it has reminded me of how important it is to try to live out the Catechism in my daily life and it has helped me to invigorate my faith. Thank you for your time and attention.

Dermot Layden

April 2014

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⁵ Maryvale refers to the UK but the points are also valid in relation to Ireland and the rest of the Western World.

⁶ This refers to seventh part of the first section (“The Treatise of Divine Providence”) of the Dialogue.

Bibliography

Catechism of the Catholic Church. Dublin, Veritas Publications, 1994.⁷

Maryvale Institute. Certificate in Studies of the Catechism, Unit 4. Birmingham, United Kingdom. Dublin: Aid to the Church in Need (Ireland), 2003. 88-115.

Pope Francis. Evangelii Gaudium: Apostolic Exhortation of the Holy Father Francis, 2013.⁸

Pope Francis. Lenten Message of Our Holy Father Francis 2014.⁸

Pope Leo XIII. Rerum Novarum: Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor, 1891.⁸

YOUCAT: Youth Catechism of the Catholic Church. Ignatius Press, 2011.

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⁷ Please note that a slightly revised edition of the Catechism of the Catholic Church was brought out in 1997, and is available online at the Vatican website. However, none of the revisions affect the quotations (i.e. paragraphs) used in this book

⁸ All of these are available online at www.vatican.va

Suggested Further Reading:

Padraig Corkery. Companion to the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. Dublin: Veritas Publications, 2007.

John Murray. Issues of Justice and Peace. Dublin: Veritas Publications, 2005.

Other Publications referred by the Catechism/Maryvale Institute Notes:
[As the publications are given by title rather than by author within the text, this section is in alphabetical order by title followed by the author (if applicable) and year].
Acta Apostolicae Sedis 31. 1939.⁹
Address at Pentecost. Pope Pius XII, 1 June 1941.⁹
Centesimus Annus. Pope John Paul II, 1991.⁹
The Dialogue of St Catherine of Siena. St Catherine of Siena. 14th century.
Dignitatis Humanae. Pope Paul VI, 1965.⁹
Diuturnum illud. Pope Leo XIII, 1881.⁹
Donum Vitae. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1987.⁹
Epistle of Barnabas. Epistula ad Corinthios. St Clement of Rome, 1st century. Evangelium Vitae. Pope John Paul II, 1995.⁹
Familiaris Consortio. John Paul II, 1981.⁹
Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modern World. Pope Paul VI, 1965. 9
Immortale Dei. Pope Leo XIII, 1885.⁹
Laborem Exercens. Pope John Paul II, 1981.⁹
Lumen Gentium: Dogmatic Constitution on the Church. Pope Paul VI, 1965.⁹
Mater et Magistra. Pope John XXIII, 1961.⁹
Octogesima Adveniens. Pope Paul VI, 1971.⁹
Pacem in Terris. Pope John XXIII, 1963.⁹
Populorum Progressio. Pope Paul VI, 1967.⁹
Quadragesimo Anno. Pope Pius XI, 1931.⁹
Redemptor Hominis. Pope John Paul II, 1979.⁹
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. Pope John Paul II, 1987.⁹
Summa Theologiae [or Theologica]. St Thomas Aquinas, 1265-74. Summi Pontificatus, Pope Pius XII, 1939.⁹

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⁹ Available online at www.vatican.va

Appendix

YOUCAT – Reproduction of Chapter Two, Human Community, paragraphs 321 to 333